

International Research Journal of Business and Social Science

Volume: 11 Issue: 3  
July-September, 2025  
ISSN:2411-3646



DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16920407>

## *Research Article*



# Understanding the Law of Agency in Business: Legal Responsibilities and Liabilities of Agents

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## ABSTRACT

The law of agency serves as a foundational doctrine in commercial transactions, enabling principals to act through agents across a multitude of sectors. This paper explores the legal responsibilities and liabilities of agents within both common and civil law jurisdictions, offering a comprehensive analysis of how agency relationships are formed, executed, and regulated. Drawing upon doctrinal, comparative, and socio-legal methodologies, the study outlines the duties agents owe to principals, third-party obligations, and the corresponding liabilities that arise from breaches or unauthorised acts. In an era of digital globalisation, the scope of agency has expanded, introducing complexities in e-commerce, artificial intelligence, and cross-border legal harmonisation. By evaluating legislative reforms and jurisprudential trends, the research identifies emerging challenges and proposes a modernised framework for agency law. The findings underscore the need for adaptive legal strategies that reflect evolving business realities while safeguarding principal-agent-third-party dynamics.

## ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 30 June 2025

Revised 10 July 2025

Accepted 12 July 2025

## KEYWORDS

Agency Law, Legal Responsibilities, Agent Liability, Digital Business, Comparative Law, Reform

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## INTRODUCTION

The law of agency is a foundational pillar in both standard and civil law systems that regulates relationships where one party, the agent, is authorised to act on behalf of another, the principal. In business, this legal framework facilitates transactions, delegation of authority, and the expansion of enterprise operations through representatives. As global business operations grow increasingly complex, understanding the responsibilities and liabilities of agents is essential for ensuring legal compliance and risk management.

This paper seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of agency law in business, focusing on the scope and limits of an agent's authority, the fiduciary duties imposed upon them, and the extent of the principal's liability for the agent's actions. Special attention is given to statutory developments, judicial interpretations, and challenges posed by technological advancements such as digital agents and AI-based decision-making tools.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical lens of this study is primarily grounded in principal-agent theory, which has its roots in the economic analysis of organisational behaviour and corporate governance. Developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the theory conceptualises the agency relationship as a contractual one in which the principal delegates work to the agent, who performs that work. A

fundamental concern of the theory is the problem of aligning the agent's actions with the principal's interests, particularly under conditions of information asymmetry and divergent incentives. Such misalignments often give rise to agency costs—expenses associated with monitoring, incentivising, or bonding the agent to act in the principal's best interest.

In legal scholarship, principal-agent theory serves as a framework for understanding how legal doctrines are crafted to address these agency costs. Legal mechanisms such as duties of loyalty and care, conflict-of-interest rules, indemnification provisions, and termination clauses aim to reduce the risks associated with opportunistic behaviour by agents. These mechanisms are enforced through judicial scrutiny and statutory regulation, thus intersecting economic theory with practical legal frameworks (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005).

To complement this, the study incorporates fiduciary duty theory, which emphasises the ethical and legal obligations imposed on agents. Fiduciary theory, as articulated in the works of Conaglen (2005) and others, regards agency relationships as involving trust and dependency. The law recognises this by imposing heightened obligations of loyalty, confidentiality, full disclosure, and good faith on the agent. Fiduciary breaches are not merely contractual defaults but violations of ethical standards embedded in legal norms. This theory thereby addresses concerns that economic models like principal-agent theory

might inadequately account for the moral dimensions of legal responsibility.

Moreover, the research employs institutional legal theory to understand how societal norms, regulatory bodies, and judicial institutions shape agency relationships. Institutional theorists like North (1990) and March & Olsen (2006) argue that legal rules do not exist in isolation but evolve through a dynamic interplay between formal laws, social expectations, and enforcement mechanisms. In the context of business, institutions such as company boards, regulatory agencies, and courts create and reinforce norms governing agent behaviour.

In sum, the integration of these three theoretical frameworks—principal-agent theory, fiduciary duty theory, and institutional legal theory—provides a multidimensional perspective on the law of agency. This triangulation allows the study to analyse not just the doctrinal content of agency law but also the behavioural, ethical, and institutional contexts in which agency relationships operate.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on agency law spans doctrinal analysis, theoretical exploration, and comparative studies across jurisdictions. Historically, foundational works such as Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (2014) and Fridman's Law of Agency (2012) have been instrumental in codifying and interpreting key principles such as authority, ratification, estoppel, and liability.

In the field of economic analysis of law, Jensen and Meckling's (1976) work has laid the foundation for a wide array of studies investigating the implications of agency costs in corporate governance and commercial contracting. Eisenhardt (1989) expanded on this with an interdisciplinary approach, examining how agency theory applies not only to economics but also to organisational behaviour and law. These works underscore the recurring issue of how to ensure that agents act in the best interests of principals in the face of moral hazard and informational asymmetry.

Legal scholars have also critically examined the fiduciary aspects of agency. Conaglen (2005) argues for a nuanced understanding of fiduciary loyalty, emphasising its role in maintaining trust-based relationships rather than merely preventing conflict of interest. Langbein (2005) and Penner (2014) further debate the normative foundations of fiduciary law, questioning whether it should be seen as a distinct legal category or an extension of contract law. This debate is particularly relevant in understanding judicial approaches to fiduciary breach cases.

Comparative legal literature highlights both convergence and divergence in agency law across jurisdictions. Zimmermann (1996) provides a comprehensive overview of agency principles in Roman and German law, noting the doctrinal differences from Anglo-American traditions. Rühl (2011) explores the private international law dimensions of agency, particularly issues of

jurisdiction and choice of law in cross-border transactions.

Technological evolution has spurred recent literature examining the implications of digital agents and artificial intelligence. Solaiman (2020) questions the capacity of non-human agents to possess legal personality or fiduciary responsibility. Similarly, Casey and Niblett (2017) investigate how blockchain and smart contracts challenge traditional agency paradigms, prompting calls for legal reform.

Further, academic discourse has expanded to include the role of agency in corporate governance. Clarke (2007) explores how corporate agents—particularly directors and officers—navigate fiduciary obligations within complex organisational hierarchies. Bainbridge (2003) critiques overregulation of fiduciary duties, advocating for market-based mechanisms to align interests instead.

While these sources vary in focus and methodology, they collectively contribute to a comprehensive understanding of agency law as both a doctrinal and socio-economic phenomenon. However, a gap remains in synthesising these diverse perspectives within a unified framework, particularly in addressing the challenges posed by globalisation and technological change. This study seeks to fill that gap by combining doctrinal legal analysis with theoretical and comparative insights.

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This study adopts a doctrinal legal research methodology, a traditional and widely accepted method in legal scholarship that involves systematic analysis of legal principles, statutes, and judicial decisions. The doctrinal method is particularly suitable for this research as it allows the identification, interpretation, and critical evaluation of existing legal rules governing the law of agency in business contexts. It facilitates a structured understanding of the legal responsibilities and liabilities of agents by engaging deeply with authoritative legal sources.

The doctrinal analysis is conducted through the examination of primary sources such as statutes, case law, and judicial interpretations from various jurisdictions, particularly the United Kingdom, the United States, and India. Key statutory texts analysed include the Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006) in the U.S., the Companies Act 2006 in the U.K., and the Indian Contract Act 1872. These jurisdictions are chosen for their representative value in common law traditions and the prevalence of agency relationships in commercial practice.

Secondary sources include legal textbooks, commentaries, and peer-reviewed journal articles that provide critical perspectives on agency principles, fiduciary duties, and liability doctrines. Important academic works such as Bowstead and Reynolds (2014), Fridman (2012), and Bainbridge (2003) form the backbone of the doctrinal critique and legal synthesis.



Additionally, the research incorporates qualitative content analysis of landmark judicial decisions to examine how courts interpret the duties and liabilities of agents. Key cases such as *Watteau v. Fenwick* (1893), *Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties* (1964), and *Panorama Developments v. Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics* (1971) are evaluated to extract legal principles and discern trends in judicial reasoning. The qualitative aspect allows for a nuanced understanding of judicial attitudes toward agency relationships and helps identify areas of ambiguity and inconsistency in the application of law.

Furthermore, this study uses a comparative legal approach to assess how different legal systems address similar issues under agency law. It contrasts common law principles with those from civil law jurisdictions such as France and Germany, focusing on key areas like authority, liability, and fiduciary obligations. This comparative analysis is vital for understanding the convergence and divergence in legal standards across jurisdictions and provides a global context for the challenges of regulating agency relationships in business.

The integration of doctrinal, qualitative, and comparative methodologies provides a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach to the study. By triangulating these methods, the research ensures both depth and breadth in legal analysis and enhances the robustness of its findings.

## HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND OF AGENCY LAW

The law of agency has ancient roots that can be traced to Roman law, where the concept of *mandatum* allowed one person (*mandatarius*) to act on behalf of another (*mandator*) without direct compensation. Though primitive by modern standards, Roman agency law established the core concept of delegated authority that would later be refined and expanded in common and civil law traditions (Zimmermann, 1996).

In the English standard law system, agency law evolved significantly during the 17th to 19th centuries, influenced by commercial expansion, colonial trade, and the rise of capitalism. Courts developed doctrines to deal with the growing complexity of commercial relationships, such as implied authority, estoppel, and fiduciary duty. Landmark cases like *Watteau v. Fenwick* (1893) and *Freeman & Lockyer* (1964) shaped key principles that still guide agency law today.

Agency law was eventually codified in various statutes, particularly during the 19th century. In India, for example, the Indian Contract Act of 1872 formally incorporated agency principles, including sections on the creation of agency, agent's duties, principal's liability, and termination of agency. Similarly, the U.S. developed the Restatement series to provide a comprehensive legal framework. The Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006)

synthesises judicial decisions and scholarly opinions to offer a cohesive set of rules and commentary.

Conceptually, the agency relationship is built upon three primary elements: (1) consent between the principal and agent, (2) authority granted to the agent, and (3) the agent's ability to affect the principal's legal position through acts performed within that authority. The nature of this relationship imposes both rights and duties on the agent and the principal, forming a bilateral and fiduciary dynamic (Fridman, 2012).

Over time, several doctrines have emerged to govern agency relationships:

- Actual Authority: Express or implied permission granted to an agent by the principal.
- Apparent Authority: Authority perceived by third parties due to the conduct of the principal.
- Ratification: The principal's post hoc approval of unauthorised acts.
- Estoppel: Prevents the principal from denying the agent's authority where third parties relied on it.

These doctrines not only facilitate commercial efficiency but also serve to protect third parties from hidden or deceptive arrangements. The balance between principal's liability and agent's accountability has always been central to agency law.

In civil law systems, such as in Germany and France, the codification of agency principles appears in respective civil codes. The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB), for example, treats agency under the heading of representation (Vertretung) and emphasises formal consent and documentation. The French Code Civil similarly emphasises formal legal authorisation and limits on liability.

In modern times, the conceptual scope of agency law has expanded to include corporate actors such as directors, officers, and employees. These individuals function as agents of the corporate principal and are subject to fiduciary duties and liability principles. The development of corporate agency has introduced new layers of complexity, particularly in areas like securities regulation, mergers and acquisitions, and international business law (Clarke, 2007).

The historical evolution of agency law reflects a dynamic response to economic, social, and technological changes. Its conceptual foundations—delegation, authority, and accountability—remain central, but their interpretation has adapted to the needs of modern commerce. This adaptability has ensured the continued relevance of agency law across centuries and legal systems.

## LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF AGENTS

In the context of agency law, the responsibilities of agents are not merely functional; they are legal obligations that form the backbone of fiduciary relationships in business. Agents are entrusted with the authority to act on behalf of their principals, creating a binding relationship that carries substantial responsibility. The foundational legal responsibilities include the duty of care, duty of loyalty, duty of obedience, duty to provide information, and duty to account. These obligations aim to preserve trust and prevent abuse of power, ensuring that the agent acts in the best interest of the principal (Munday, 2010).

The duty of care obliges agents to perform their functions with the skill, competence, and diligence that is reasonably expected in their professional field. A breach of this duty, such as negligence or mismanagement, can result in liability for any losses incurred by the principal (Fridman, 2012). For example, a real estate agent who fails to disclose material defects in a property may be held accountable for damages resulting from that omission. Similarly, the duty of loyalty requires agents to act solely in the interest of their principals. This means avoiding conflicts of interest, self-dealing, or using confidential information for personal gain (Miller & Jentz, 2013).

The duty of obedience necessitates that the agent follow all lawful instructions given by the principal. An agent exceeding their authority or acting contrary to the principal's directions may void the contract or render themselves liable. However, in some cases, courts recognise implied authority when the agent's deviation is reasonable and in the best interest of the principal (Beale & Dugdale, 2007).

Another crucial responsibility is the duty to inform. Agents are expected to relay all relevant information that may affect the principal's decision-making process. Failure to do so may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty and result in adverse consequences. Lastly, agents must maintain a duty to account, which involves proper record-keeping and transparency regarding financial transactions, assets, or other resources managed on behalf of the principal (Brodie, 2010).

These legal responsibilities are not only codified in statutes like the Restatement (Third) of Agency in the United States and similar legislative frameworks globally, but are also reinforced through judicial interpretation. Courts have consistently emphasised that fiduciary duties are stringent, demanding utmost good faith and integrity from agents (Langbein, 2005). Business practices that involve agents—whether in sales, employment, or partnerships—must be carefully governed by contracts that explicitly outline these responsibilities to reduce the risk of litigation and to enhance accountability mechanisms.



In the globalised economy, the legal responsibilities of agents are increasingly influenced by international commercial laws, such as the UNIDROIT Principles and the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency. These instruments offer harmonised standards to ensure legal predictability and fair conduct in cross-border transactions (UNIDROIT, 2016).

## **LEGAL LIABILITIES OF AGENTS**

While responsibilities focus on duties owed by agents, legal liabilities address the consequences of breaching these duties. An agent's liability may arise under contract law, tort law, statutory provisions, or equitable principles. Legal liability is primarily concerned with the extent to which agents are held accountable for losses, damages, or other harms resulting from their actions or omissions in the course of performing their duties (Collins, 2003).

Firstly, agents can be contractually liable when they act outside their scope of authority. If an agent purports to bind a principal without proper authorisation, they may be personally liable to the third party for breach of warranty of authority (Munday, 2010). This doctrine is fundamental in cases where third parties rely on the apparent authority of agents who lack actual authority. Courts have reiterated that liability may arise not only from express agreements but also from implied or ostensible authority.

Secondly, agents may incur tortious liability for acts of negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, or defamation committed within the scope of their agency. If an agent provides false information or misleads third parties while negotiating on behalf of a principal, the agent may be personally liable for damages. In jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and Australia, tort law has been instrumental in expanding the scope of agent liability, particularly in professional services and financial advice (Brodie, 2010).

In addition to civil liability, agents may also be subject to statutory penalties under specific regulatory frameworks. For instance, agents involved in securities transactions, insurance brokerage, or customs operations are governed by specific legislative acts that impose duties and sanctions for misconduct. Failure to comply with disclosure requirements or fiduciary standards in such sectors may result in administrative fines, license revocation, or even criminal liability in cases of fraud or embezzlement (Fridman, 2012). Importantly, the principle of vicarious liability must also be considered. While typically applied to employers, it can occasionally apply to principals who may be held liable for the wrongful acts of their agents if those acts were committed within the scope of the agency. Conversely, agents may be indemnified by their principals for lawful acts done in good faith under the terms of the agency agreement (Langbein, 2005).

Judicial precedent plays a significant role in defining the scope of agent liability. Courts often analyse the intent, knowledge, and conduct of the agent to determine liability. For example, in *Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd* [1964] 2 QB 480, the court underscored the importance of apparent authority in assessing agent liability. Similarly, U.S. cases like *Mill Street Church of Christ v. Hogan* emphasise implied authority and the principal's liability for the acts of agents.

As business models evolve to include digital and AI-driven agents, questions of liability are being revisited. While human agents are liable under established laws, the legal framework for autonomous agents remains ambiguous. Legal scholars and legislators are exploring doctrines such as strict liability, negligence-based liability, and even the extension of personhood status to AI agents in high-risk commercial sectors (Scholz, 2017).

In sum, understanding the legal liabilities of agents is essential for mitigating risk in business relationships. Drafted contracts, adequate training, and legal awareness can significantly reduce the exposure of agents and principals to liability claims.

## **PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY FOR AGENT'S**

The principal's liability for the acts of an agent is a core tenet of agency law, rooted in the

foundational legal maxim "qui facit per alium facit per se" (he who acts through another, acts himself). This doctrine imposes legal responsibility on the principal for acts performed by the agent within the scope of authority conferred upon them. The principal's liability is primarily divided into three categories: actual authority, apparent authority, and ratification.

### **Liability under Actual Authority**

Actual authority is the express or implied power granted by the principal to the agent to act on their behalf. When an agent acts within the boundaries of such authority, the principal is directly liable for the legal consequences of those actions (Munday, 2013). Express authority is explicitly communicated through written or verbal agreements, while implied authority arises from the nature of the task or customary practices in a particular trade.

### **Liability under Apparent Authority**

Even when actual authority is lacking, the principal may be bound by the agent's actions under the doctrine of apparent or ostensible authority. This occurs when a third party reasonably believes, based on the principal's conduct, that the agent was authorised to act. In such cases, courts often apply the principles of estoppel to hold the principal accountable (Fridman, 2012).

### **Liability through Ratification**

A principal can also incur liability by ratifying unauthorised acts performed by an agent.

Ratification can be express or implied through the principal's conduct. It retroactively validates the agent's actions and binds the principal to the resultant obligations, provided the agent acted on behalf of the principal, and the principal had full knowledge of the facts (Munday, 2013).

### **Vicarious Liability and Tortious Acts**

Principals may also be vicariously liable for torts committed by agents acting within the scope of employment or authority. This aspect of liability reflects a policy-based decision to protect third parties and allocate risk to those best able to bear it, typically employers (Miller & Jentz, 2017).

### **Exceptions and Limitations**

However, principals are generally not liable for acts of agents acting outside their authority or for criminal actions unless the principal was complicit or negligent in supervision. The demarcation between personal acts of the agent and those for which the principal is answerable remains a subject of evolving legal interpretation.

### **Judicial Interpretations**

Courts across jurisdictions have upheld these principles while adding nuanced interpretations based on specific fact patterns. For example, in *Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties* [1964], the English Court of Appeal held the principal liable due to apparent authority even though the agent lacked actual authority. Similarly, in *Watteau v. Fenwick* [1893], a principal was held liable for acts outside actual

instructions but within the usual authority of such an agent.

### **Policy and Commercial Considerations**

The allocation of liability to principals reflects a balance between business efficiency and third-party protection. In contemporary commerce, where large corporations act through numerous agents, these principles serve as essential safeguards for ensuring transactional fairness and responsibility.

## **AGENCY IN THE DIGITAL AND GLOBAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT**

The traditional concepts of agency law are increasingly being tested and reshaped by the forces of globalisation and digital transformation. With the emergence of e-commerce, artificial intelligence (AI), virtual platforms, and cross-border operations, agency law must evolve to address new types of relationships, challenges in accountability, and jurisdictional complexities.

### **Digital Agents and AI**

Digital transformation has led to the rise of "electronic agents" — autonomous computer programs capable of executing transactions. These agents operate without human oversight in many cases, raising critical legal questions about authority, liability, and contract enforceability (Kerr, 2004). Traditional agency law assumes human agents who possess consciousness and intent, but digital agents lack such attributes.

For instance, under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN Act) in the U.S., electronic agents are recognised in contractual contexts. However, this does not extend to general agency relationships, creating a regulatory gap (Froomkin, 1996).

### **Cross-border and Multinational Agency**

Global business environments demand a reconsideration of agency law in cross-border transactions. Jurisdictional issues often arise where the agent acts in a different country from the principal. Divergent legal systems, conflict of law rules, and enforcement difficulties compound the complexity (Ziegel, 2006). For instance, an agent in India negotiating on behalf of a U.S. principal in Europe may trigger the applicability of different agency laws in three jurisdictions.

### **E-Commerce Platforms and Intermediaries**

Many e-commerce platforms act as intermediaries, facilitating transactions between buyers and sellers while also imposing terms and conditions akin to agency agreements. The legal classification of such intermediaries is often ambiguous. Are they agents, independent contractors, or something else? The answer impacts liability and obligations.

Cases like *Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller* [2020] in Canada and similar decisions worldwide have underscored the blurred boundaries between agents and digital intermediaries. Courts have been divided on

whether platform workers and facilitators represent principals or operate independently.

### **Blockchain and Smart Contracts**

The adoption of blockchain technology and smart contracts introduces new agency challenges. These self-executing contracts perform obligations automatically when conditions are met, often without direct human input after deployment. This raises concerns over who bears liability for failure, coding errors, or manipulation.

If a competent contract agent commits an act that harms a third party, determining who is liable becomes a key issue. Current legal frameworks lack sufficient clarity on how agency principles apply here (Wright & De Filippi, 2015).

### **Regulatory Responses and Legal Reform**

Various jurisdictions have begun adapting legal rules to address digital and global agency. The European Union's Digital Services Act, for example, holds platforms accountable for specific intermediary actions. Similarly, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has proposed enhanced transparency requirements for AI-based systems engaged in commerce.

However, comprehensive regulatory alignment remains absent. Legal scholars advocate for international conventions or model laws to harmonise the law of agency in digital and global contexts (Ziegel, 2006).

### **Ethical and Accountability Issues**

Digital agency also raises ethical concerns, such as bias in AI decision-making, surveillance, and data privacy. Holding principals accountable for the acts of digital agents who may autonomously engage in discriminatory practices is a growing challenge.

### **Future Outlook**

The future of agency law will likely require a hybrid framework that incorporates both traditional legal doctrines and novel regulatory strategies for digital and cross-border business. Lawmakers, jurists, and business entities must collaboratively navigate this evolving terrain.

## **COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMON AND CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS**

The legal framework governing agency relationships varies significantly between common law and civil law systems, reflecting distinct historical, cultural, and institutional foundations. A comparative analysis of these legal traditions provides critical insights into the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of agency law across jurisdictions.

In common law jurisdictions such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, agency law is primarily governed by judicial precedent and case law. Courts play a central role in defining and evolving the doctrines that underpin the agency relationship. The

principal elements of agency—authority, consent, control, and fiduciary duty—are derived from judicial decisions and are supplemented by statutory enactments in commercial contexts (Munday, 2010). For instance, in the UK, the Law of Property Act 1925 and the Companies Act 2006 provide statutory support to agency-related transactions, especially in the realm of corporate and commercial representation.

In contrast, civil law systems such as those in France, Germany, and Japan codify agency law within comprehensive civil codes. These codes often provide a structured framework for agency relationships, outlining the rights and obligations of principals and agents in precise detail. The French Civil Code (Code civil), for instance, treats agency under the broader concept of “mandate,” wherein Article 1984 defines it as a contract by which one person gives another the power to do something for the principal and in the principal’s name. Similarly, the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB) meticulously outlines agency principles in sections 164 to 181, including provisions for representation, authorisation, and ratification.

A critical point of divergence lies in the concept of authority. Standard law systems distinguish between actual authority (express or implied) and apparent authority. Apparent authority arises when a third party reasonably believes that an agent is authorised to act on behalf of the principal, even if the principal did not confer such authority (Waterson, 2006). This doctrine aims to



protect third parties in commercial dealings. The English case *Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd* [1964] 2 QB 480 exemplifies how courts enforce apparent authority to promote commercial certainty.

In civil law jurisdictions, however, the emphasis is more on actual authority, and the doctrine of apparent authority is either absent or significantly restricted. Civil codes generally require that third parties verify the existence and scope of an agent's authority, thereby reducing the principal's exposure to unauthorised acts. This creates a more formalistic environment, which may offer greater protection to principals but imposes heavier verification burdens on third parties (Zweigert & Kötz, 1998).

Fiduciary obligations also differ. In standard law systems, agents owe a duty of loyalty, care, obedience, and accounting to their principals. These fiduciary responsibilities are rigorously enforced, particularly in cases involving conflicts of interest or misappropriation of assets. Landmark judgments such as *Boardman v Phipps* [1967] 2 AC 46 and *Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver* [1942] 1 All ER 378 underscore the uncompromising standards of loyalty and good faith imposed on agents.

In civil law systems, while similar duties exist, they are typically framed as contractual obligations rather than fiduciary. The emphasis is on the terms agreed upon in the mandate contract, and courts tend to interpret these terms within the

context of civil obligations rather than equitable doctrines. This legal orientation reflects the broader civil law preference for codified norms over judge-made equity principles.

Furthermore, the treatment of undisclosed principals varies between the systems. In common law, an agent may act on behalf of an undisclosed principal, allowing the principal to enforce or be bound by the contract. Civil law jurisdictions generally do not recognise this concept, requiring transparency in principal-agent relationships to ensure legal certainty and accountability (Sealy & Hooley, 2009).

International commercial law instruments also reflect these differences. For instance, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts attempt to harmonise aspects of agency law but often adopt a middle-ground approach to accommodate both traditions. Similarly, the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency (1978) provides conflict-of-law rules to address cross-border agency relationships, recognising the distinct rules governing authority, liability, and ratification in different legal systems.

From a practical standpoint, these differences have substantial implications for multinational corporations, international contracts, and cross-border dispute resolution. Businesses operating in multiple jurisdictions must carefully tailor agency agreements to align with local legal requirements. For example, a multinational

enterprise entering the Japanese market must recognise that power-of-attorney documents are strictly interpreted, and informal representations by agents may not bind the principal unless formal authorisation is evident (Kanda & Milhaupt, 2003).

Legal harmonisation efforts are underway, especially within regions such as the European Union, where directives and regulations aim to create a more cohesive legal environment for commercial agency. The EU Commercial Agents Directive (86/653/EEC) standardises key aspects of agent-principal relationships across member states, including remuneration, termination rights, and indemnity provisions. However, national implementations vary, reflecting lingering differences in legal culture and commercial practice.

In summary, the comparative analysis of agency law in common and civil law systems highlights both convergence and divergence. While globalisation and harmonisation efforts have promoted some degree of alignment, foundational differences in legal philosophy, structure, and doctrine persist. Understanding these contrasts is essential for legal scholars, practitioners, and policymakers engaged in international commerce and legal reform.

## **CHALLENGES AND REFORMS IN MODERN AGENCY LAW**

The law of agency, while foundational to business transactions, continues to face significant challenges due to evolving commercial practices, globalisation, technological advancement, and the dynamic nature of legal systems. The modern commercial environment demands reform not only to address ambiguities in agent-principal relationships but also to enhance the efficiency and fairness of these relationships in light of contemporary expectations. This section critically analyses the principal challenges encountered in current agency law and discusses reform initiatives proposed or enacted in various jurisdictions.

### **Complexity and Ambiguity in Legal Definitions**

One of the fundamental challenges in agency law is the lack of consistency and clarity in defining agency relationships. Despite the widespread application of agency principles, courts and legislatures often differ in how they interpret an agent's authority, fiduciary duty, and the scope of liability (Goldman & Sigismond, 2020). The distinction between actual and apparent authority remains particularly contentious, leading to inconsistent legal outcomes. For instance, in jurisdictions following common law principles, courts have varied interpretations of what constitutes implied or ostensible authority, sometimes diverging significantly from civil law understandings (Fridman, 2017).

This lack of uniformity can hinder cross-border commercial transactions, where businesses and agents operating across multiple jurisdictions may face conflicting legal obligations and uncertainties about enforceability. The ambiguity also affects third parties who may struggle to ascertain the legitimacy of an agent's actions and the extent to which a principal is bound by them (Munday, 2019).

### **Technological Disruption and Digital Agency**

The digital age has introduced unprecedented complexities into the traditional agency framework. Increasingly, businesses rely on digital agents—such as automated software, algorithms, or artificial intelligence (AI) systems—to conduct commercial transactions. These digital agents, while not natural persons, perform functions analogous to those of traditional agents, including entering into contracts and making decisions based on programmed criteria (Kerr, 2021).

This development raises important questions about legal personhood, accountability, and fiduciary duty. Can an AI system be held liable for a breach of duty? If so, who bears the legal consequences—the programmer, the owner, or the user of the technology? As many jurisdictions have not yet recognised digital agents as legal entities, there is a regulatory vacuum that requires urgent legislative and judicial attention (Palmer & Finkelstein, 2022).

Reform efforts in this area have been slow. However, the European Union and countries such as Japan and South Korea are beginning to explore legal recognition of electronic agents under specific conditions. This trend underscores the need for a global framework that harmonises digital agency practices and clearly defines the rights and responsibilities of involved parties.

### **Cross-Border Agency and Conflicts of Law**

Globalisation has intensified the use of agents in cross-border transactions, creating a new set of challenges concerning jurisdiction, applicable law, and enforcement of rights. Conflicts of law arise when the legal systems of two or more countries differ on crucial aspects of agency law, such as recognition of authority, duration of agency, or remedies for breach (Dicey, Morris & Collins, 2021).

Such discrepancies can cause uncertainty, primarily when agents act in one country on behalf of a principal domiciled in another. Reform efforts aimed at harmonisation, such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, provide some guidance, but they lack binding force. As a result, scholars and practitioners advocate for treaties or conventions that establish uniform agency principles across jurisdictions (Ziegel & Rockel, 2019).

### **Fiduciary Duties and Conflicts of Interest**

A persistent challenge in agency law is the enforcement of fiduciary duties, particularly the

duty of loyalty and the obligation to avoid conflicts of interest. In practice, agents may simultaneously serve multiple principals or engage in self-dealing, often with limited oversight (Weisbrod, 2020). Current legal frameworks vary widely in how they address such behaviour, with some jurisdictions imposing strict liability, while others allow for a more flexible approach based on disclosure and consent.

Reform proposals frequently emphasise the need for stronger compliance mechanisms and enhanced transparency requirements. For instance, corporate governance reforms in the United Kingdom and Australia have extended fiduciary responsibilities to agents involved in managing shareholder relations and investor communications (Cadman & Klumpes, 2018). In these contexts, fiduciary rules are also applied to agents like financial advisors and real estate brokers, further complicating the scope of traditional agency law.

### **Inadequate Remedies and Enforcement Mechanisms**

Another major challenge is the limited scope of remedies available for breaches of agency obligations. While common remedies include damages, indemnity, and rescission, these are often inadequate in complex commercial settings where losses are intangible or reputational. Furthermore, enforcement is complicated by evidentiary challenges, particularly where agency

relationships are informal or undocumented (Winfield & Jolowicz, 2019).

To address these issues, legal reforms advocate for specialised tribunals or arbitration bodies to handle agency disputes with greater efficiency. Additionally, digital recordkeeping, blockchain-based contracts, and electronic verification are being explored as tools to increase transparency and accountability in agency relationships (Chauhan & Ghosh, 2023).

### **Regulatory Gaps and Need for Comprehensive Reform**

Despite the critical role agency plays in commerce, many jurisdictions lack comprehensive, updated statutes governing agency law. Instead, fragmented regulations are found scattered across corporate, contract, employment, and tort law. This patchwork approach fails to reflect the complex realities of modern business operations and agent-principal relationships.

Calls for reform suggest the need for codification of agency law, similar to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the United States, which could bring clarity and predictability. Legal scholars also advocate for periodic reviews of agency legislation to ensure alignment with emerging business models and technological advancements (Beale et al., 2019).

## CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The law of agency plays a pivotal role in modern commerce by facilitating delegation and representation in both domestic and transnational transactions. This research has traced the foundational elements of agency relationships, highlighting the nuanced legal responsibilities of agents and the liabilities that both agents and principals may incur. Through a comparative examination of common and civil law systems, it becomes evident that while the core tenets of agency are similar, the enforcement mechanisms, liabilities, and procedural nuances vary significantly. These differences necessitate tailored approaches in cross-border commercial operations.

Furthermore, the study reveals that the expansion of digital and global business environments has introduced new dimensions to the concept of agency. Agents now function through digital platforms, artificial intelligence systems, and decentralised business models, which challenge traditional legal frameworks. Despite these advancements, many jurisdictions still rely on outdated legislative provisions that inadequately address the realities of contemporary agency practice.

This paper argues for the modernisation of agency law to align with global commercial trends, enhance legal certainty, and protect all parties involved in agency relationships. Reforms

must balance flexibility with accountability, ensuring that agents act within their authority and that principals remain vigilant about the conduct of their representatives. Moreover, harmonisation between national and international legal instruments is crucial for managing cross-border agency conflicts.

In summary, the legal doctrine of agency must evolve in response to the changing commercial landscape. This includes reinterpreting old principles through modern lenses, updating legislative texts, and enhancing judicial awareness of novel agency scenarios. Only then can agency law continue to serve its foundational function in a fair, efficient, and predictable manner.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of this research, several practical and scholarly recommendations are proposed to improve the effectiveness and adaptability of agency law in the contemporary business environment:

- **Legal Reform and Harmonisation:** Jurisdictions should initiate legislative reforms to incorporate provisions addressing electronic agency, AI-driven agents, and cross-border agency relationships. International organisations such as UNCITRAL could develop model laws to promote harmonisation across legal systems.
- **Judicial Training and Interpretation:** Courts must be equipped to interpret



agency laws in light of digital technologies and complex commercial arrangements. Judicial training programs should incorporate modules on AI, digital contracts, and e-commerce law.

- **Policy Development for AI Agents:** Policymakers should explore the potential for creating a legal status for AI agents, clarifying the scope of liability, authority, and representation when machines or platforms act autonomously on behalf of human principals.
- **Transparency and Disclosure Regulations:** Regulatory authorities should implement more straightforward guidelines for disclosure obligations, especially in cases of dual agency, undisclosed principals, and online transactions where transparency is limited.
- **Enhanced Contractual Practices:** Businesses should be encouraged to draft detailed agency agreements that outline the scope of authority, risk allocation, indemnity clauses, and termination procedures to minimise legal ambiguities.

### **Future Research Directions**

Future studies should focus on empirical analysis of how agency law operates in specific industries such as fintech, e-commerce, and international trade. Moreover, interdisciplinary research combining law, technology, and ethics can offer insights into how AI and smart contracts

challenge conventional notions of agency. Comparative research examining the implementation of recent agency law reforms in various jurisdictions could also yield valuable best practices and inform future international instruments. Ultimately, the continued evolution of global commerce necessitates a dynamic and forward-looking approach to agency law scholarship.

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